The Federal Reserve Open Market Committee: President's message. by Thomas M. Hoenig
n my first day on the job as president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, Oct. 1, 1991, I was a participant 
at the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open 
Market  Committee  (FOMC)  meeting,  and 
that following January, I was a voting member. 
As prescribed by a rotating schedule of votes, 
I have voted every three years since then. In 
2010,  in  an  environment  of  unprecedented 
challenges, I will again be a voting member.  
The  Federal  Reserve  has  three  mission 
areas,  each  focused  on  financial  stability—
financial  services,  banking  supervision  and 
regulation,  and  monetary  policy.  Though 
the Federal Reserve’s broad role in monetary 
policy is well-known to the public, the regional 
Reserve Banks’ role in monetary policy is less 
well-known or understood.  
In some way this lack of understanding is 
not surprising as it contrasts with the Reserve 
Banks’ local business activities. For example, 
the  connection  between  our  regional  Bank 
providing local financial services to commercial 
banks—including the processing of currency, 
providing transactions accounts and support-
ing interbank payments—seems natural. Simi-
larly the value of the regional structure in our 
regulation and supervision of nearly a thou-
sand banks and bank holding companies locat-
ed within the Tenth Federal Reserve District is   
pretty basic. 
But where the regional structure plays its 
most important role is in the formation of a 
national monetary policy that is based on lo-
cal input. In various forums, including public 
speeches and in past editions of TEN maga-
zine, I have discussed at length the important 
reasons behind the Federal Reserve’s innovative 
regional structure that links the central bank’s 
national  policy  delibera-
tions directly to the local 
communities  we  serve. 
This connection is crucial 
in  preventing  the  Federal 
Reserve  from  becoming 
an  “inside  the  beltway,” 
Washington-based  entity. 
In  fact,  the  key  reason 
for its design by Congress 
nearly  a  century  ago  was 
the recognition that an in-
stitution viewed as under 
the control of Washington 
or Wall Street was not a central bank the pub-
lic would trust to best serve the interests of the 
entire nation—as evidenced by two previous 
failed attempts to run a central bank from the 
then-power center of Philadelphia. The struc-
ture of the Federal Reserve System is truly a 
product of the populist movement. Although 
the world has changed much in the last 100 
years,  many  argue  this  broad  representation 
from across our nation is even more important 
today than it was at the time of the Federal Re-
serve’s founding.
History
The FOMC is responsible for the Federal 
Reserve’s  open  market  operations,  which  is 
the most often used of the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy tools. The FOMC’s decisions 
about its target for the federal funds rate, which 
is the interest rate that depository institutions 
lend their balances at the Federal Reserve to 
other  depository  institutions  overnight,  are 
closely followed because of the impact they have 
on the broader economy. Moves in the federal 
funds rate eventually influence borrowing costs 
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for everything from credit cards to mortgages, 
which means they can either stimulate or slow 
the economy.
 The structure of the FOMC was created 
by the Banking Act of 1935, largely through the 
work of then-Sen. Carter Glass. Although many 
individuals were involved in 1913’s passage of 
the Federal Reserve Act—including Oklahoma 
Sen. Robert Owen—perhaps no individual is 
as readily identified with the nation’s central 
bank as Glass. As a congressman, Glass was 
not only the House sponsor of the legislation 
that  created  the  Federal  Reserve,  but  also  a 
key  figure  in  its  design.  Later,  in  the  mid-
1930s  as  the  nation  was  emerging  from  the 
Great Depression, Glass played the key role in 
making sure that the Federal Reserve’s regional 
structure—its  key  strength—was  utilized 
on  what  some  consider  its  most  important 
committee. In that battle, he faced some strong 
opposition from an unlikely source—one that 
was within the Federal Reserve. 
Then-Federal Reserve Chairman Mariner 
Eccles  wanted  to  consolidate  control  of  the 
decentralized bank under his direct authority 
in Washington. Eccles saw the financial crisis 
as an opportunity. In his landmark history of 
the Federal Reserve, historian and economist 
Allan  Meltzer  writes  that  “Eccles  wanted  a 
central  bank  with  authority  concentrated  in 
Washington, specifically in his hands.” 
Glass, meanwhile, argued that centralized 
control was an affront to the System, designed 
and  approved  by  Congress  and  signed  by 
President  Woodrow  Wilson.  Glass,  it  seems 
clear, recognized the extreme risks of such a 
consolidation. World history has shown time 
and  again  that  monetary  policy,  when  it  is 
linked  too  closely  to  the  political  process, 
becomes an extremely seductive tool for elected 
office holders. The lure of creating an artificial 
economic boom for a short-term boost in the 
polls is powerful and often overwhelms concerns 
about long-term economic consequences.  
The battle between Glass and Eccles came 
to something of a head when Eccles testified 
before  Glass’  Senate  Committee.  Glass  and 
Michigan  Sen.  James  Couzens  both  asked 
Eccles  repeatedly  how  the  centralization  he 
favored would have helped the nation when 
the  stock  market  collapsed  and  the  Great 
Depression  began  to  take  shape.  Eccles  was 
unable  to  come  up  with  a  response  to  the 
question and later wrote a letter admitting that 
the powers would not have made a difference 
in 1929.
In addition to making sure the regional 
banks had a voice in open market operations, 
Glass also made sure that the individuals who 
provided  that  voice—the  regional  Reserve 
Bank  presidents—were  free  of  Washington 
influence.  At  Glass’  direction,  the  1935  Act 
includes language that says the regional Federal 
Reserve Bank Boards of Directors, who come 
from local communities within each District, 
appoint presidents and other officers of their 
respective Federal Reserve Banks.  
Structure
By  design,  there  are  12  members  who 
vote at each FOMC meeting; they include all 
seven members of the Federal Reserve’s Board 
of Governors as well as presidents from four 
of the 11 regional Federal Reserve Banks on a 
rotating basis. The New York Federal Reserve 
president was designated as a permanent voting 
member of the FOMC on the premise that it 
has a special role in the markets. This structure carefully balances public and private interests 
by giving a majority of the 12 votes to the seven 
Federal Reserve governors, who are presidential 
appointees who have been confirmed by the 
Senate.  In  recent  history,  however,  that  has 
not been the case. Due to a lack of presidential 
appointments, there has not been an FOMC 
meeting involving seven governors for almost 
five years, and for much of the time since spring 
2005, the Board of Governors, which also has 
broad oversight for the entire Federal Reserve 
System, has had two vacancies. 
The  intent  of  the  lengthy  terms  of  the 
governors (14 years for members and four years 
for the chairman and vice chairman) and the 
independent status of Reserve Bank boards and 
presidents provides the System with a needed 
degree of independence to resist pressure for 
short-run  decisions  based  on  Washington’s 
two-, four-, and six-year election cycles. The 
central bank must be free to make decisions 
that it judges to be in the long-run best interest 
of the national economy.
Media  coverage  of  the  regional  Reserve 
Bank presidents often notes if they are a “voter” 
or  “non-voter”  on  the  FOMC.  In  terms  of 
policy  deliberations,  the  distinction  between 
the two is perhaps less substantial than some 
might assume. 
All  Federal  Reserve  Bank  presidents 
participate  in  all  FOMC  meetings.  Both 
voters and non-voters provide the committee 
with  information  about  business  activity 
within their regions. During the first of two 
go-rounds that are the key elements of each 






















nThere  are  some  who  believe  very  strongly 
that the Federal Reserve must always present 
a  united  front  in  terms  of  policy  action  or 
risk weakening its stature. I strongly disagree 
with that position, and the structure supports   
my position. 
If there was no room for dissention, then 
why would the FOMC vote on policy actions? 
If the goal was to keep differences in opinion 
a private matter, why would the outcome of 
those votes be made available to the public? 
The Federal Reserve’s founders, as well as those 
members  of  Congress  involved  in  forming 
the  FOMC  during  the  crisis  of  the  1930s, 
recognized  that  an  institution  with  room 
for dissention and a willingness to entertain 
contrasting  opinions  is  stronger  overall  and 
more worthy of public trust. Although these 
disagreements  or  dissenting  votes  may  be 
portrayed by Federal Reserve watchers as signs 
of weakness or a struggling central bank, to 
me they are a mark of strength and evidence 
that  the  system  is  functioning  exactly  as  it   
was designed.  
the full committee with a brief but important 
report  on  local  economic  conditions.  These 
reports are based on firsthand accounts that the 
regional Reserve Banks receive from business 
and  banking  contacts  within  their  Districts. 
Through their comments, the presidents weave 
an  insightful  tapestry  of  the  U.S.  economy 
for  the  FOMC.  It  is  a  picture  that  is  more 
current than even the most recently available 
data, which can be weeks or even months old. 
Because  this  is  firsthand  information,  rather 
than being backward looking, it is focused on 
immediate  conditions  and  future  concerns. 
Often, these accounts are the first indications 
of changing economic conditions or emerging 
issues. It is perhaps impossible to overstate the 
valuable role this insight can have in our policy 
deliberations.
The regional Bank presidents, of course, 
offer  much  more  to  the  monetary  policy 
process than reports about their Districts. All 
members, regardless of voting status, analyze 
national  trends  and  offer  comments  on  the 
national and international outlook. They ask 
questions of other Reserve Bank presidents and 
the governors. And during a second go-round, 
each  president  discusses  the  possible  policy 
action and has ample opportunity to offer his 
or her insights and opinions regarding policy 
to  the  full  committee  prior  to  the  vote.  All 
participants play a vital role in the process.
Voting
Having  said  all  this,  I  do  not  want 
to  downplay  the  significance  of  being  a 
voting member. It is, in fact, among the key 
responsibilities  of  a  regional  Federal  Reserve 
Bank president and it is certainly one of the 
most  important  components  of  our  System. 
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